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PLEASE DON’T FEED THE HOMELESS: POTTINGER REVISITED
By Shirley D. Howell*

I

n 1988, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, viduals who had no homes and were “doubled up”13 living with
Pottinger v. City of Miami,2 alleging that city officials friends or relatives. Only those persons “who lack a permanent
acted in concert to deprive them of their civil rights. address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping accomWhile the Pottinger litigation was ongoing, Hurricane modations for human beings... and those living in shelters”14
Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in were considered homeless. Thus, those living under the roofs of
its wake3 and creating what the Pottinger court termed “a worst their families and friends did not meet the definition.
possible” scenario.4 It was the first time that a hurricane figured
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population
into homelessness litigation, and it is likely that the outcome of before Hurricane Katrina.15 Women16 accompanied by minor
the case was in fact affected by the hurricane. The court held children17 were the fastest growing segment of the chronically
Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 the homeless18 and made up 36% of the homeless population.19
Eighth Amendment,6 the Fourth Amendment,7 the Due Process Some 750,000 children were homeless20 before Katrina and 1.5
Clause,8 and the right to travel,9 perhaps in part because the trag- million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”21 Fifty percent
edy of mass homelessness was showcased by Hurricane An- of the homeless were African Americans, 35% White Ameridrew. In the face of so great a
cans, 12% Latinos, 2% Native
homeless population, the Court
Americans, and 1% were Asian
The causes of
could not dismissively assume
Americans.22
Your house is your larger body
America’s rising homelessness
that people were homeless as a
It grows in the sun and sleeps
rate have been debated for decresult of a perverse desire to be
In
the
stillness
of
the
night;
ades. Some contend that perso, nor would it ignore the multiAnd it is not dreamless. 1
sonal deficiencies such as mental
ple violations of their constituillness,23 substance abuse,24 intional rights.
carceration,25 and an intergeneraThe similarities between the
homelessness scenarios created by Hurricanes Andrew and tional dependence upon welfare26 are the primary causes of
Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an unassimi- homelessness. Others cite macroeconomic factors such as loss
lated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning of low-income housing,27 unemployment and underemployranks of America’s homeless population. While compassion has ment,28 and a regressive tax structure.29 Notably, neither school
worn thin, evacuees have been ousted from temporary lodging. of thought considers the impact of natural disasters.
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless
If adequate societal measures are not taken to house these evacuees, they will be forced to live in the streets, parks, and under population in American history, the public had developed
“compassion fatigue” with homelessness.30 San Francisco enbridges, as were the Pottinger plaintiffs.
acted a series of ordinances through its so-called Matrix ProThis article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the
gram to criminalize sleeping in a park, begging near a highway,
national homeless population rises to approximately five milor blocking a sidewalk.31 Eleven thousand of San Francisco’s
lion in the twenty first century. Part I summarizes the demopoorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix Prographics and causes of mass homelessness and addresses negagram.32 In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, transtive public reactions to the increased visibility of the homeless
ported to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers,
in major American cities. Part II outlines and discusses the succhained for hours, and ultimately released to a different locacessful causes of action brought by the homeless in Pottinger.
tion.33 Massachusetts has imposed criminal sanctions upon
Part III concludes by setting forth proposals that would reinthose who “move about from place to place begging.”34 Alavigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing,
bama has made it a criminal act to wander about “in a public
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the homeplace for the purpose of begging.”35
less suspect classification.
In response to increasing homelessness in 1984,36 during
OVERVIEW OF HOMELESSNESS BEFORE HURRICANE
which thousands of individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial
KATRINA
Park37 and other public venues, Miami police were directed “to
In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were home- identify food sources for the poor and to arrest and/or force an
”38
To keep the
less on any given night.10 Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Ameri- extraction of the undesirables from the area.
”39
11
the
parks and
homeless
moving
and
effectively
“sanitize
cans experienced homelessness every year, and 30% of the
12
streets, police were relentless in raiding the campsites of the
homeless had been without homes for more than two years.
40
41
These numbers do not include the indeterminate number of indi- homeless, summarily destroying all on-site belongings. HisSpring 2007

15

tory is repeating itself. In July 2006, Las Vegas enacted an ordinance to ban the giving of food to the homeless.42 A violation of
the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of $1,000 and
a jail term of up to six months.

POTTINGER REVISITED
If America’s Post-Katrina response to the unprecedented
surge of homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them
or jailing those who feed homeless, the issues and remedies addressed in Pottinger become relevant again. These issues and
remedies are addressed below.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns
the voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions. Purely
involuntary acts cannot properly or morally be condemned as
crimes under the Eighth Amendment. To punish a person for
his or her involuntary act would be cruel.43 The question then is
whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary. A homeless
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert homelessness as justification for the misdeeds. In that case, status as a
homeless person is irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be
expected to tolerate such behavior. The question is more complex when a homeless defendant with nowhere else to go is
prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park. Is a
public action “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must
perform it to survive, and he has no private place in which to
perform the action?
The Pottinger court resolved the question by asking another: is the defendant voluntarily homeless?44 If a defendant
has voluntarily chosen to be homeless, he could be legally and
morally deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk of having
to break the law to survive. It is unreasonable for society to
lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate
a private and voluntary choice of that character. However, if the
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should
not prosecute him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his or
her homelessness. The success of the Pottinger case rested in
large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that they were
suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were compelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46
The United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Califor47
nia held that a defendant could not be criminally punished for
mere status as a drug addict, finding that a statute that made it
punishable to be addicted to narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48 In Powell v. Texas,49 the Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could be jailed
for appearing drunk in public.50 The Court held that Powell had
not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51 Powell is often cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless for
the proposition that the homeless are not being punished for
being homeless, but for their actions in violation of the law.
Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is involuntar16

ily homeless. The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drinking to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no
homes in which to perform what are usually private acts.52
Sleeping in parks, sitting on sidewalks, and begging are perfect
examples. To criminalize such actions when they are unavoidable is tantamount to prosecuting the homeless for existing, and
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments is impermissibly violated.
The plaintiffs have historically borne the burden to establish
that their public actions were, in fact, unavoidable. In Pottinger,
the plaintiffs met that burden with statistical evidence and expert
testimony.53 The plaintiffs offered irrefutable statistical evidence of the severe shortage of beds in homeless shelters in Miami when they were arrested.54 The expert witnesses also testified that people seldom choose to be homeless.55 However, public policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of proving the voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed.
The homeless, by definition, are persons with extremely
limited resources, and they are not entitled to state-appointed
attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their rights. But for the
pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties Union,56 the
Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the
homeless population. They also would not have been able to
procure the experts57 who were pivotal in establishing that people are seldom homeless by choice.58 The better public policy
would allow the plaintiff to meet the burden of a prima facie
case by establishing the actions committed by the state or municipality in violation of his or her rights and the fact of his
homelessness at the time of arrest. The burden should then shift
to the defendants to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that the plaintiff is voluntarily homeless and thus, answerable
for his or her public actions. This policy would serve dual meritorious purposes: (i) to enhance the ability of the homeless
plaintiff to find counsel who would accept his or her case, and
(ii) to motivate states and their municipalities to cease efforts to
harass the homeless out of their towns, and instead explore serious options for providing adequate affordable housing.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation
of those meager resources that they still have. In Miami, the
police frequently destroyed the on-site belongings of the homeless59 as though the property were public rubbish. In one particularly notorious raid, the Miami police handcuffed a group of
homeless individuals, piled their clothing, medications, and a
Bible together, and burned them while the homeless watched.60
The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed
their property without due process of law in direct violation of
the Fourth Amendment.61
While a seizure of property occurs when there is a
“meaningful interference” with an individual’s interest in that
property,62 a seizure of property is unreasonable only if the
state’s legitimate interests in the seizure do not outweigh the
THE MODERN AMERICAN

individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the
search.63 The question then is whether the plaintiffs have a legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may
appear to others to be public rubbish. Determining the nature of
any legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property involves two separate inquiries. First, the court inquires whether
the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the objects.64 Second, the court must determine whether that expectation is one that society should be prepared to recognize as reasonable.65 If the homeless make efforts to protect their belongings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person
to guard them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of
privacy.
The second inquiry is more difficult. Should the public
recognize the homeless person’s right to privacy when his or her
property is littering the streets or public parks? In Rakas v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court offered guidelines for determining the
legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests. As a trespasser or
one who leaves property accessible to the public, the plaintiff
may lose his or her privacy interests in the property; whereas
one who is lawfully on property and shields it from public view
may retain a subjective expectation in privacy that the public
will recognize. The term trespasser is turned on its head “when
there is nowhere” private that a homeless person may lawfully
be.67
The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
whether a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest
in their property that the public would find reasonable, but a
Connecticut court has addressed the issue in part. Based on society’s established deferential treatment of closed containers, the
court in State v. Mooney68 recognized a right of privacy in the
closed duffel bags of the homeless. The court elaborated:
[T]he interior of these items is, in effect, the
defendant’s last shred of privacy from the prying eyes of outsiders, including the police.
Our notions of custom and civility, and our
code of values, would include some measure
of respect for that shred of privacy, and would
recognize it as reasonable under the circumstances of this case.69
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing
or medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose
them? From the perspective of the homeless, the answer is selfevident. However, municipalities also have a legitimate interest
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be
compromised by the accumulation of rubbish. The Pottinger
court balanced the conflicting interests, holding that the homeless had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their property, so
long as the property did not create a public danger.71 The court
held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses
with exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger.
However, the court enjoined the destruction of non-harmful possessions such as Bibles, clothing, eyeglasses, medications, and
Spring 2007

personal identification, and declared such destruction a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.72
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing innocent, necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or
overbreadth. A statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice
of the forbidden conduct.73 The Supreme Court held void vagrancy ordinances in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville because the statutes did not give sufficiently clear notice of the
behavior that was prohibited.74 Loitering statutes have suffered
the same fate. In 1983, the Supreme Court overturned California’s loitering statute that required citizens wandering the streets
to produce identification upon a police officer’s request.75 Although the homeless plaintiffs in Pottinger did not attack Miami’s ordinances on a vagueness theory, the plaintiffs did focus
on the unconstitutional overbreadth of the ordinances when they
were applied to innocent conduct of the homeless.
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally protected conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state
to regulate.76 A challenge based upon overbreadth will be upheld if the enactment reaches “a substantial amount”77 of constitutionally protected conduct. Prior to Pottinger, there was no
precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting to enjoy
constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized
as expressive conduct.78 For the most part, however, when the
homeless eat, sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive
conduct. They are performing those acts for the same reasons
the housed perform them: they are necessary to survival. However, the Pottinger court held that when an involuntarily homeless person performs such acts in public “at a time of day when
there is no place they can lawfully be,”79 the statute becomes
overbroad for punishing innocent conduct, and the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause is impermissibly infringed.80
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to travel as a
fundamental right in Edwards v. California81 and reaffirmed it
in Shapiro v. Thompson.82 In striking down a Connecticut statute denying public assistance to persons who had not been residents of the state for one year, the Shapiro decision reasoned
that the statute discouraged travel by the poor by withholding
benefits from those who would have otherwise qualified to receive them.83 In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County84 struck down a statute that conditioned
free medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.85
This case is especially significant in homelessness cases because
the Court specifically denounced the statute for denying indigents “the basic necessities of life”86 and for the deterrent effect
such statutes have on the rights of the poor to migrate.
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a com17

pelling state interest.87 They must also represent the least intrusive method for furthering those state interests.88 State interests
such as maintaining public spaces in order to promote tourism,
business, and developing inner-city downtown and park areas
are not compelling interests. The Supreme Court has held that
such interests are substantial but not compelling.89 Further, the
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to
achieving the goals of promoting tourism or developing business. The involuntarily homeless arrested under such laws have
no recourse but to return to their public lives upon their release
from custody. Thus, nothing is ultimately accomplished by the
arrests. If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to business
and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent
housing for their homeless populations.
CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In 1961, the Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights protections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety
years. In Monroe v. Pape,90 the Court concluded that a party
injured by the unconstitutional actions of police officers could
recover damages in federal court under § 1983. The police
broke into the Monroe home, rousted them from bed, and ransacked the house.91 Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not allowed to call his attorney and was not promptly arraigned.92
Monroe claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.93 He further claimed
that his constitutional rights had been violated by the detention.
Reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the claims against the
police officers,94 the Supreme Court opined that police conduct
may be actionable when it is in violation of constitutional rights.
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city
officials when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy.”95 In § 1983 litigation, the homeless plaintiffs also bear the burden of establishing that the actions were both persistent and widespread.96 Evidence that the actions were isolated would be legally insufficient
to warrant relief against the municipality,97 though the offending
officers might remain liable for the actions.
In Pottinger, discovery revealed internal memoranda that
were “directed to high-ranking police department officials”98
regarding the need to oust the homeless from Miami’s public
areas. The persistent and widespread nature of the attacks on the
homeless was a matter of public record. Over 3,500 homeless
individuals had been arrested in Miami when the suit was filed.
The city could not escape liability under § 1983 for its acts of
purposeful harassment of the homeless.99
EQUAL PROTECTION
In Harper v. State Board of Elections,100 the Supreme Court
opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to
one's ability to participate in the electoral process. Lines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”101 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
18

declined every opportunity to grant the homeless the suspect
classification that is afforded to other historically victimized
groups. This status is critical to the homeless population since
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are
subjected to strict scrutiny102 and cannot stand unless the state
demonstrates a compelling interest that is furthered by a narrowly tailored policy.103
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its
suspect-class analysis: (i) whether the disadvantaged class is
defined by a trait that frequently bears no relationship to ability
to contribute to society; (ii) whether the class has been saddled
with unique disabilities because of prejudice and inaccurate
stereotypes; and (iii) whether the trait defining the class is immutable.104 The homeless can make a strong claim to a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty,
and that state of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an
actual inability to contribute to society. Many of the homeless
have strong work histories105 and were rendered homeless by
events beyond their control.106 One has only to review the acts
perpetrated against the homeless in Miami and San Francisco to
be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public against
the homeless.
The last prong of analysis proves more challenging. Do the
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics? If the term
means literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the
homeless must fail in their attempts to achieve suspect classification. The judicial history of the term does not, however, suggest so rigid a definition. Aliens, who enjoy protection as a suspect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their
“immutable” characteristic. Gender, which is protected, can be
altered surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic. By
analogy, the mere fact that the homeless can again become
housed does not alter the fact that, while one is in fact homeless,
it is physically apparent to society.
The Supreme Court in Lyng107 adopted a broader interpretation of immutability, including an inquiry as to whether the class
members “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”108 The homeless
have glaringly distinguishing characteristics: they reside under
bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other public places, and they
beg.
POTTINGER’S IMPACT
Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade. Ultimately, the
court enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so
long as they ere not engaged in conduct harmful to others or
themselves.109 Miami was ordered to establish “safe zones”110
in areas where the homeless could access food programs and
health services. The parties ultimately negotiated a financial
settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.111
The impact of the case was immediate. Both the city of
Miami and other private entities constructed shelters for the
homeless while the case was on appeal.112 As word spread
THE MODERN AMERICAN

about the decision in Miami, other cities took stock of their own
practices. Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum sweeps”113
and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to social services in lieu of making arrests.114

CONCLUSION
As America’s homeless population reaches five million
after Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in
Las Vegas are to be anticipated unless society becomes proactive. Congress must reinforce incentives for constructing affordable housing and raise the minimum wage. Meanwhile,
“safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere else
to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those

areas to protect homeless men, women, and children from the
violence of the streets.
As America’s most vulnerable population, the homeless
must be afforded a “suspect class” designation. They are easily
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily
change. They have suffered the deprivation of the most fundamental rights because their very existence frightens the greater
population on a visceral level. The goal, however, is not only to
place the homeless in a better position to defend their constitutional rights, but to create a society that rejects “compassion
fatigue” in favor of indefatigable compassion and commitment115 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen.
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